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CASENOTES
Has the Equal Protection Standard for 11legitimates Been Revised?: Lalli v.
Lalli' — New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law section 4-1.2(a)(2) 2 pro-
vides that an illegitimate child's right to inherit intestate from his father is
contingent on whether the child obtains a court order of filiation prior to the
father's death.' In 1973, Robert Lalli (Robert), the illegitimate son of Mario
Lalli, sought a court order compelling an accounting by the administratrix of
his father's estate." Robert acknowledged that he lacked the requisite order
of filiation required by the statute, but offered other evidence of his relation
to Mario Lalli. ' The Surrogate's Court excluded this evidence, reasoning
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney), enacted by 1965
N.Y. Lass's, c. 958, § 1.
Id. Article 4 of the N.Y. Estate, Powers Sc. Trusts Law governs the descent
and distribution of an intestate estate. Section 4-1.1 sets forth, in part, the distributive
shares of the surviving child, children and/or descendants. For the purposes of § 4-1.1
these words refer to the legitimate or lawful children and/or.
 descendants. An illegiti-
mate child's rights of inheritance are set forth in § 4-1.2. Prior to its 1979 revision, this
section provided:
§ 4-1.2 Inheritance by or from illegitimate persons
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(I) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and
his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and
his issue inherit, from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has,
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring
paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or
within two years from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the
illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the
father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by sub-
paragraph (2).
(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may he made only by the
father, and such motion must be made within one year from the entry of
such order.
(b) if an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, mater-
nal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administration
as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or
obtain such letters only if an order of filiation has been made in accord-
ance with the provisions of subparagraph (2).
This section was substantially amended by the enactment of 1979 N.Y. Laws, c. 139,
§ 1, effective May 29, 1979. The amendment extended the statutory period for obtain-
ing the court order of' filiation from two to ten years and provided an alternative
procedure for establishing paternity so as to qualify an illegitimate child to inherit
from his father. This alternative procedure requires the father to file a formal
acknowledgement of paternity with the State Department of Social Services. N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (1979) (McKinney).
439 U.S. at 261. Robert Lalli claimed that both he and his sister, Maureen,
were entitled to inherit from their father, Mario Lalli, as his children. Id.
Id. at 262-63. During his lifetime, Mario Lalli had provided financial sup-






that the method of proof specified in section 4-1.2—"an order of filiation
declaring paternity"—was the sole permissible means by which an illegitimate
child could establish his right to inherit from his father's estate. 6 The court
therefore denied Robert's request for an accounting of the estate and granted
the administratrix's motion to dismiss Robert's claim. In so doing, the Surro-
gate's Court rejected Robert's contention that the statute's exclusion of alter-
nate evidence of paternity denied him equal protection of the law by denying
him the opportunity to inherit as would a legitimate child.'
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Surrogate's decision, 8 and
Robert Lalli appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 8 In a five-to-four
plurality decision, the Supreme Court held: New York can constitutionally
condition an illegitimate child's right to inherit from his intestate father on a
single specific method of proof of paternity." The Court found that New
York had a legitimate and important interest in assuring the orderly and just
disposition of an intestate's property upon his death. Provided a state does not
predicate the right of inheritance on the marital status of the illegitimate
child's parents, the Court ruled, the state may give effect to its legitimate
interest by legislatively prescribing any method of proof that bears a substan-
tial relationship to the purpose underlying its intestacy statute."
from persons who stated that Mario had acknowledged openly and frequently that
Robert and Maureen were his children. Furthermore, after Robert's mother died in
1968, Mario provided the requisite parental consent when Robert married in 1969.
Incident to this consent, Mario acknowledged that Robert was his son in a writing
sworn to before a notary public. Id.
Id. at 263.
7 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. At this time, the Surrogate's Court was bound by
a United States Supreme Court decision permitting states to condition the inheritance
rights of illegitimate children in order to further a rational state goal. See text at note
25 infra.
Robert also argued that § 4-I.2(a)(2) was unconstitutional in requiring the pater-
nity proceeding to take place during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years
of the birth of the child. Since he failed to get the order of filiation, however, a re-
quirement that the Supreme Court held was constitutionally sound, the Court con-
cluded that Robert lacked standing to argue this secondary challenge. 439 U.S. at 267
n.5. For consideration of this latter challenge, see Estate of Harris, 98 Misc.2d 766, 414
N.Y.S.2d 612 (1979) (invalidating the two year limitation), and cases cited therein.
8
 38 N.Y.2d 77, 340 N.E.2d 721 (1975).
9
 This was actually the second time the Court agreed to hear Robert's case.
While the case was pending before the Court the first time, it decided a similar case,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The Court therefore vacated and remanded
Robert's case to permit further consideration in light of Trimble. Lalli v. Lalli, 431 U.S.
911 (1977). On remand, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision.
In Re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481 (1977). It is from this second appellate
decision that Robert sought the Supreme Court's review discussed in this casenote.
I" 439 U.S. at 275-76. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in
an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. Id. at 261. In addition,
Justice Stewart wrote a short opinion responding to a particular point made in the
concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun. Id. at 276. Justice Rehnquist was the fifth to
concur in the judgment of the plurality, for the reasons he set forth in his dissenting
opinion in Trimble. Id. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Brennan, who was
joined by Justices White, Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 277.
" Id. at 275-76.
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This casenote will examine the Lalli decision to determine its ramifica-
tions for Future intestacy law challenges brought. by illegitimate children. After
a brief discussion of the prior case law in the area, the opinions in Lalli will he
presented. The casenote then will analyze the Court's reasoning in Lalli with a
view toward ascertaining the ultimate significance of the decision for chal-
lenges to intestate succession provisions similar to the New York provision at
issue in Lalli. It will be submitted that the Court's decision in Lalli signifies a
retreat from the "middle-tier" level of scrutiny 12 employed in earlier decisions
"Middle-tier" scrutiny 'is a phrase which describes the intensity of judicial
review into the constitutionality of a statute challenged on equal protection grounds.
Although the degree of intensity in middle-tier scrutiny has never been succinctly ar-
ticulated, it lies between minimal scrutiny and strict scrutiny, both of which are dis-
cussed below.
The Court employs minimal scrutiny in cases where the challenged state action
concerns economic and social welfare. Realizing that legislatures must draft laws based
on generalizations about people's situations, the Court has only required that the clas-
sifications drawn be rationally related to the purpose underlying the state's action.
Application of such scrutiny generally leads to upholding the challenged action. Mini-
mal scrutiny is the traditional standard applied in reviewing equal protection chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); MeGowen v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913).
See generally Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065
(1469); Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341
(1949).
The standard of strict scrutiny is used when a statute concerns suspect classifica-
tions or interferes with fundamental constitutional rights. Under this standard, the
statute is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity. Instead, the state, rather
than the plaintiff, must bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that its classification
was premised upon a compelling state interest and was structured with such precision
so as to be the least restrictive means for effectuating the state goal. If these two
prongs of the test cannot be demonstrated, the statute under review will be declared
constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
16 - 17 (1973): Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964). The traditional indicia of a suspect classification are that the class is
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian politi-
cal process.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Fundamental rights, for
equal protection purposes, have been limited to those rights and liberties that are ex-
pressly or impliedly protected by the Constitution. Id. at 29-36. See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (personal privacy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (equal
voting opportunity); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel).
The Court has also used what many commentators have labeled "middle-tier"
scrutiny, although the Court itself has riot enunciated it as such. Justice Powell de-
scribed this standard as follows:
As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had difficulty in agreeing
upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be applied consis-
tently to the wide variety of legislative classifications. There are valid
reasons for dissatisfaction with the "two-tier" approach that has been prom-
inent in the Court's decisions in the past decade.... As has been true of
Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be viewed by some as a
"middle-tier" approach. While I would not endorse that characterization
and would not welcome a further subdividing of equal protection analysis,




involving the constitutional rights of illegitimate children." Whereas the
Court previously had required that a statute classifying illegitimate children
differently than legitimate children be substantially related to its purpose, the
effect of the Court's inquiry in Lalli was to focus on whether the burden
imposed by the statute was merely rationally related to its purpose. Nonethe-
less, it also will be submitted that because the Court expressly stated it was not
overruling recent precedent in the area, a reconciliation of Lalli with the prior
case law may limit Lalli's precedential significance to its facts. Lalli should be
construed as standing for the proposition that statutes requiring a judicial
record of the paternal relationship to be established prior to the father's death
before permitting paternal inheritance by an illegitimate child are constitu-
tionally sound.
I. PRIOR CASE LAW: FROM
LABINE V, VINCENT TO TRIMBLE V, GORDON,
THE RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN EXPAND
At common law, a child horn out of wedlock had no parents and there-
fore was excluded from all rights of inheritance granted legitimate children,
save the right to inherit from the heirs of his own body." This harsh rule
has been ameliorated by statutory schemes. For example, all states now allow a
mother's property to be transferred upon her death to her children, be they
basis" standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when
we address a gender-based classification. So much is clear from our recent
cases.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n * (1976) (Powell, j., concurring). This middle level
of scrutiny requires that the classification serve important government objectives and
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. In considering the rela-
tionship between the classification and the state's objectives, the Court looks at the
alternatives reasonably available to the state to accomplish the statutory purpose and
the reasons why the slate chose the challenged classification over the available alterna-
tives to become the law. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 784 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In the Court's application of this test, the level of scrutiny used, while less
than strict scrutiny, is significantly more than the traditional standard. See generally
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 —Forward: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Gunther]. For the application of this intermediate level of scrutiny in
cases where the challenged classifications were based on illegitimacy, see note 34, infra
and accompanying text.
' 3
 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (CA 1973), summarily aff'd, 418 U.S. 901
(1974); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Griffen v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.
1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Conn. 1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
14 I. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 458 (1765). See generally H. KRAUSE, IL-
LEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
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legitimate or illegitimate." Since an illegitimate child obviously is of his
mother's blood, any denial by an intestate succession scheme of inheritance
from and through the mother, while granted to legitimate children, is consid-
ered unjustified. 11' The same is not true, however, of the illegitimate child's
right 10 inherit from his intestate father.
In 1971, the Supreme Court. considered Labine v. Vincent," a constitu-
tional challenge to an intestacy statute brought by the illegitimate daughter of
an intestate man." Although the child's mother and father never married,
they jointly executed a Louisiana Board of Health certificate two months after
the child's birth which acknowledged that the father was in fact. the child's
natural father.'• Under Louisiana law, this acknowledgment gave the plain-
tiff a right to demand suppoii from her natural father or his heirs. 20
 Two
articles of the Louisiana Code, however, prevented her from inheriting a por-
tion of her father's estate. One article provided that "rilllegitimate children,
though duly acknowledged, cannot claim the rights of legitimate children."! 1
The second article further provided that "[n]atural children are called to the
inheritance of their natural father, who had duly acknowledged them, when
he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviv-
ing wife, and to the exclusion only of the State." 22 Since the decedent in
Labine was survived by collateral relations, the plaintiff was prohibited from
sharing in his estate at al1. 23 The plaintiff challenged these provisions, con-
tending that they denied her equal protection of the law on the basis of her
illegitimacy. 24
In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that these provisions were uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court deferred to the Louisiana legislature and held
that the state's power to structure rules for intestate succession included the
power to make incidental classifications based on illegitimacy." Provided the
classification drawn was rationally related to the statute's purpose, the Court
stated that the statute would not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. 20 Applying this principal to the Louisiana intestacy statute, the
Court identified the statute as being designed both to direct the disposition of
property left within the state's borders and to promote legitimate relation-
15 H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POL/CY 25 (1971).
1 " See Glona v. American Guarantee & Surety Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Vallin v. gondesson, 346 Mass. 748, 196 N.E.2d 191
(1964).
" 401 U.S. 532 (1971). This was the third case in which the Court reviewed
statutes classifying according to illegitimacy. See China v. American Guarantee &
Surety Co„ 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death statute); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968) (same).
' 8
 401 U.S. at 533.
39 Id.
2° LA. Civ. CODE ANN., arts. 239-42 (West).
21
 LA. Civ. CODE ANN., art. 206 (West),
22
 LA. Civ. CODE ANN., art. 919 (West).
2:t
	 U.S. at 534.
2 ' Id. at 535.
25 Id. at 537-39.
20
 Id. at 537-40.
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ships. The Labine Court found that a rational relationship existed between
these purposes 27 and the means used to achieve them. Consequently, the
Court ruled that the statute was constitutional."
In 1972, the Court again considered a classification based on illegitimacy
in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surely Co." Weber involved a workmen's com-
pensation statute whose purpose was to provide support. for dependents of
deceased employees. The statute, however, effectively denied benefits to de-
pendent, but unacknowledged, illegitimate children. 30 The plaintiff, an un-
acknowledged dependent of her deceased father, contended that the statute
denied her equal protection of the laws by denying her benefits accorded
other dependents."
Addressing the plaintiff's contention, the Weber Court observed that the
basic problem in distinguishing between unacknowledged illegitimate children
and acknowledged illegitimate children was proving the existence of a pater-
nal relationship." From an administrative viewpoint, limiting the application
of the workmen's compensation statute to acknowledged illegitimate children
obviated the necessity of determining paternity on a case-by-case basis. While
such a distinction was convenient, the Court stated that it was not substantially
related to the statute's goal of affording support to dependent children of
deceased workers; the absence of an acknowledgment. by the natural father
did not negate the dependency of his illegitimate children. The Court further
observed that penalizing illegitimate children for the wrongdoings of their
parents was contrary to a basic concept of our legal system—that burdens
should be related to the individual responsible for the wrongdoing." The
Court therefore departed from the low level of scrutiny employed in Labine,
and held that a state must. demonstrate the existence of a substantial relation-
ship between a statutory classification based on illegitimacy and the interest to
be promoted by that statute. 34 Applying this standard to the Weber statute,
the Court found such a relationship wanting, and held the statute unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.
27 Id. at 536 n.6. The Court identified the statute as being designed both to
direct the disposition of property left within the state's borders and to promote legiti-
mate family relationships. Id.
25 Id. at 539-40. The Court also found the Louisiana law unobjectionable be-
cause it did not create an insurmountable barrier to illegitimate children's ability to
inherit. There are other means by which a natural father could provide for his il-
legitimate children upon his death. For example, the Court noted, a father could pro-
vide for a child in his will or he could legitimate the child for inheritance purposes by
marrying the child's mother. Id. at 539.
For a good background examination of discrimnation against illegitimate children,
see H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
29 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
3° Id. at 168.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 174.
33 Id. at 175.
34 Id. at 170, 172-73. Although the Court did not specify the intensity of its
review in Weber it stated,
Whough the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessar-
ily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fun-
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In reaching this conclusion, the Weber Court distinguished Labine by as-
serting that the latter decision was a reflection of the particular importance of
the states' interest in regulating the descent of a decedent's property. 33 This
distinction between workmen's compensation and intestacy statutes turned out
to be short lived. Six years after Labine, the Court's decision in Trimble v.
Gordon 36 brought the analysis applicable to intestate succession challenges in
line with post -Labine developments in other areas. The plaintiff in Trimble had
been acknowledged by her father in a paternity action decided prior to his
death; her natural parents, however, never married. 37 The applicable intes-
tacy statute 38 precluded illegitimate children from inheriting from their
fathers' estate unless their natural parents married each other subsequent to
the child's birth and the father acknowledged the illegitimate child as his own.
Addressing the plaintiff's constitutional argument, the Court observed that.
the statute was not carefully tuned to reflect consideration of alternative
methods of proving paternity—methods that would advance the state's in-
terest in preventing fraudulent claims against. intestate estates without. impos-
damental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny. The es-
sential inquiry is ... a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the
classification promote:. What fundamental personal rights might the clas-
sification endanger?
Id. (citations omitted), The Weber standard was not an exercise of strict scrutiny, but
rather of a stricter scrutiny than the Court had used in Labine v. Vincent. See Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). The descrip-
tion of this standard as a substantial relationship test was not enunciated until later
cases. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Compare this scrutiny with the
scrutiny employed in relation to gender classifications. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-98 and 210 n.23 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
458-59 (1973) (White. J., concurring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
35
 406 U.S. at 170. The Court asserted that
[Labine) reflected, in major part, the traditional deference to a State's pre-
rogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders.
The Court has fang affi)rded broad scope to state discretion in this area.
Yet the substantial state interest in providing for "the stability of ... land
titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the valid owner-
ship of property left by decedents" is absent it) [Weber].
Id. quoting Labine v. Vincent, 229 So.2d 449, 452 (1..a. App. 1969).
3 ' 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
37 Id. at 764.
''" ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 3, § 12 (1973) (recodified without material change as
1/.1.. REV. STAT. ch . 3, 2-2 (h) (1976). At the time Trimble was decided the relevant
part of the statute provided:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor,
and of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living;
and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person
and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if
living. .A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is
acknowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate.
Id. But see note 139 and accompanying text for subsequent revision at 11.1.. REv. STAT.
ch . 2-2(h) (1976).
Under It.r. REV. STAT. ch . 3	 2-1 (b) (197(3), legitimate children are entitled to
inherit from both their mother and their father.
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ing so heavy a burden on the inheritance rights of illegitimate children. 39 By
way of illustration, the Court noted that the adjudication of paternity present .
in Trimble provided sufficiently compelling evidence of paternity to assure
against the possibility of fraud. 4" In unnecessarily excluding illegitimate chil-
dren with competent proof of paternity along with those children presenting
potentially fraudulent claims, the Court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad."
Although the Trimble Court reiterated the view expressed in earlier
cases' that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification," its analysis, unlike the
analysis in Labine, was far from "toothless."'" The Court acknowledged that
states have a strong interest in assuring the prompt and definitive distribution
of an intestate's estate. 45 The court averred, however, that the existence of
such an interest does not automatically trigger judicial deference to statutory
classifications." Indeed, the Court stated that even when an intestacy statute
is designed for the sole purpose of facilitating the resolution of potentially
difficult problems of proving paternity, the provision should he -drawn care-
fully to reflect the variety of methods of evidencing paternity. 47 While a state
is free to select the method of proof least likely to present significant prob-
lems of inaccuracy and inefficiency, the Court determined that. it must choose
a method substantially related to the statute's purpose and carefully tailored
to avoid overbroad classifications based on illegitimacy."
430 U.S. at 779.
.41)
4]
 Id. at 772-73.
42 See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976); Jiminez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-34 (1974).
43
 430 U.S. at 767.
" Id. Although the nimble Court did not specifically overrule Labine, it noted
that subsequent cases had limited Labine's precedential value. 430 U.S. at 776 n.17.
45 Id. at 767 n.12. See also Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 537-39.
4"
 430 U.S. at 767 11.12. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (Intestate succes-
sion law that bars an illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in
father's estate is within State's power.). In addition, the Court stated that one of the
purposes of the statute involved in Trimble—the promotion of family relationships—
could not be used as a justification for any and all statutory classifications based on
illegitimacy. Id. at 768-70.
Furthermore, the Court found that a statutory classification may deny illegitimate
children equal protection even if' they are not absolutely or broadly barred from ob-
taining a benefit. See note 28 supra. The issue of whether the challenged statute
created an insurmountable barrier to illegitimate children was an important concept in
the Court's decision in Weber, see 406 U.S. at 170-71. By the time the Court decided
Trimble, however, it had eliminated this concept from its inquiry. While the court indi-
cated that the availability of slatwory alternatives to achieve a particular goal were rel-
evant to the constitutionality of a challenged statute (see text accompanying note 54
ir9611), it stated that factual alternatives—means that had been available to the decedent
to remove the disfavored position of his illegitimate child (e.g. adoption, legitimation
by marrying the child's mother, or a will)—were not. 430 U.S. at 774.
47 Id. at 772 11.14.
48
 Id. at 772.
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In summary, in the cases following Labine," the Court formulated a
more demanding standard for scrutinizing classificatons based on illegitimacy,
including those classifications drawn by state intestacy statutes. 5 ° Although
the Court has declined to designate illegitimacy a suspect classification, it
nonetheless has demonstrated its sympathy for the proposition that illegiti-
mate children should not be punished for the wrongdoings of their par-
ents. 5 ' A state's interest in promoting family life therefore does not justify
discrimination against the offspring of extra-marital relationships. 52
Moreover, while the Court has recognized the states' interest in diminishing
the administrative problems inherent in establishing paternity on an indi-
vidual basis, it has developed the principle of requiring states to resolve the
problem of potentially fraudulent claims with due regard for the rights of
illegitimate children." In implementing this principle, the Court has insisted
that states demonstrate a substantial relationship between the statutory goal of
preventing fraud and the classification employed to achieve that end. Specifi-
49 See note 13 supra. See also 430 U.S. at 766 n.11. For an overview of the
cases decided in this interim period see Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitlinacy:
1968-1977, 11 FAMILY L.Q. 365 (1978).
5 ° Prior to the Court's decision in Trimble, lower courts had felt constrained to
follow Labine in reviewing constitutional challenges to intestacy statutes, although many
felt that the arguments accepted by the Court in subsequent non-intestacy cases
applied to intestate succession laws with equal force. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Pendleton,
531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1975), reild, 560 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1978).
51 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
52
 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See also Griffen v. Richardson,
346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Maryland 1972), WV, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
53
 For example, the Court in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), struck
down a Texas law denying illegitimate children the right to paternal support. Al-
though it recognized that the state is confronted with lurking problems with respect to
proof of paternity, the Gomez Court concluded that the state could not create an im-
penetrable barrier to illegitimate children in attempting to deal with these problems.
Id. at 538. The Court maintained this position in jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974). The statute in Jiminez did not altogether bar illegitimate children from receiv-
ing the disability benefits allotted to legitimate children. However, it granted benefits
only to those illegitimate children, "(a) who can inherit under state intestacy laws, (h)
who are legitimated under slate law, or (c) who are illegitimate only because of some
formal defect in their parents' ceremonial marriage." Id. at 635-36. If an illegitimate
child did not fall within the quoted provisions, the statute granted him benefits only if
he could prove that his father had contributed to his support or lived with him prior to
the onset of the father's disability. Id. at 634-35. Thus, the statute discriminated against
the subclass of illegitimate children born after their fathers became disabled, denying
them any chance to prove dependency. The state justified the statute as a way to
prevent spurious claims of paternity. Id. at 636. The Jiminez Court, however, did not
find such a justification sufficient. Rather, the Court stated that the state could not
conclusively and presumptively exclude illegitimate children solely to avert spurious
claims. Id. See also Beaty v, Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S.
901 (1974), where the court, after analyzing Levy, Weber, Gomez and other Supreme
Court cases, concluded that the prevention of fraud was not a sufficient justification
for an otherwise invidious classification. Id. at 307-08. Based on its analysis, the Beaty
court concluded that there is a strong principle of requiring a state to assess the
genuineness of the claims of illegitimate children. Id.
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cally, the Court has required that any legislative classification be tailored care-
fully to avoid the overbroad exclusion of illegitimate children." Although
this requirement is not as rigorous as the "least restrictive means" analysis
employed where suspect classifications are at issue, the Court has struck down
those classifications based on illegitimacy where they were either grossly
underinclusive or overinclusive. 55
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STANDARD:
LALLI V. LAW
In LaIli v. La111, 56 the Court examined the constitutionality of an intestate
succession provision that permitted only those illegitimate children possessing
a court order of filiation issued prior to their father's death to inherit from
his estate. Considering the plaintiff's challenge to the statute as denying him
rights afforded legitimate children in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court denied relief and held that the state
of New York could require an exclusive means of proof of the paternal rela-
tionship before allowing an illegitimate child to inherit from his father. 57 Jus-
tice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined by
Justices Burger and Stewart. 58
Justice Powell began his analysis of Lath with a discussion of the Court's
decision in Trimble v. Gordon. 59 Trimble, Justice Powell explained, held that
although the state's goal of promoting legitimate family relationships could
not justify a classification based on illegitimacy," the state's goal of assuring
the just and orderly settlement of estates could justify such a classification. 81
While this classification could be constitutionally permissible, the Trimble Court
cautioned that any classification based on illegitimacy must he substantially
related to this valid state goal and carefully tailored to avoid overbreadth."
Justice Powell then noted that the statute under consideration in Trimble
served two purposes. The challenged statute was designed in part to foster
legitimate family relationships, and in part to assure the just and orderly dis-
tribution of estates. Although the Trimble Court found that the primary pur-
" See text accompanying note 33 supra.
" The Court takes into consideration both the possible availability of statutory
alternatives that would minimize the statute's discriminatory effect and the degree to
which the state's interests would be compromised by the adoption of such alternatives.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-13 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1972). For an interesting discussion on the Court's
consideration of statutory alternatives, see Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Con-
stitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV.
971 (1974).
56 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
37 439 U.S. at 275-76.
56 Id. at 261.
36 Id. at 264. For a discussion of Trimble see text at notes 36-48 supra.
"" 439 U.S. at 265.
GI Id .
62 Id. at 266. See text at notes 49-55 supra.
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pose was the permissible goal of aiding in the orderly distribution of estates,
the statute was found to be neither substantially related to this underlying
purpose nor carefully tailored to avoid overbreadth. Because the statute con-
ditioned the inheritance rights of illegitimate children on their parents' mari-
tal status, the statute excluded a significant number of illegitimate children
who could establish their paternity without compromising the statute's pur-
pose. 63
 The Trimble Court, Justice Powell noted, therefore ruled that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."'
Turning to the case at bar, justice Powell noted that Lalli warranted the
same level of scrutiny as was employed in Trimble . 65 But, since he was able to
distinguish the statute at issue in Lalli from the provision overturned in Trim-
ble, he concluded that Trimble did not mandate the invalidation of the New
York intestacy statute. The provisions differed, according to Justice Powell, in
both the character of the burdens imposed on illegitimate children and the
state interest furthered by those provisions." In Justice Powell's view, the
New York provision's requirement of an order of filiation was solely an
evidentiary requirement, going directly to the heart of the paternity ques-
tion.' The intermarriage requirement of the Trimble statute, by contrast, was
wholly unrelated to the paternity issue. This difference, he observed, reflected
the different aims of the two provisions. In Justice Powell's opinion, the sole
purpose of the challenged New York provision was to provide for the just and
orderly disposition of property at death; " 8 unlike the Trimble provision, the
New York statute in no way attempted to influence family relationships."
Having explained the differences between the two provisions, Justice
Powell addressed his attention to the relationship between the burden im-
posed by the New York statute and the purpose it was designed to further.
He stated that the provision was intended to mitigate serious difficulties in the
administration of estates. To assure the finality of probate proceedings, all
parties having an interest in a given estate had to be served with process and
given an opportunity to be heard. Thus, if illegitimate children were granted
the same intestate inheritance rights as legitimate children, all illegitimate
439 U.S. at 265.
"4 Id. at 266.
"5 Id. at 268.
"I' Id. at 266-68.
' 7
 Analytically distinguishing § 4-I.2(a)(2) as an evidentiary requirement. in
contrast to the status requirement of the Trimble provision, causes conceptual difficul-
ties. The evidence that the illegitimate child in New York must present is not evidence
of the paternal relationship, the real issue fur intestate succession purposes. but is
evidence of whether the statutory requirement of a court order has been satisfied. In
essence, the requirement is one of a prior judicial finding and not one of evidence of
paternity. Regardless of whether the child can prove the filial relationship at the ad-
ministration hearing, his right to inherit front his intestate father depends on the exis-
tence of a prior judicial finding of paternity. Thus, whether or not the illegitimate
child had a primr judicial finding of paternity is ultimately, as it was in Trimble, a
question of status.
"8
 439 U.S. at 267-68.
"" Id. The illegitimate child in New York need not have been legitimated by
his father in order to inherit from him. Id. :it 2(i7.
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children, whether acknowledged or not, would have to be served with process.
Justice Powell explained that, under such circumstances, serious difficulties
could arise due to the absence of records evidencing the existence of illegiti-
mate children of intestate men."
In his analysis of the relationship of the statute to its purpose, Justice
Powell considered whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The
plaintiff contended that the New York statute, like the statute in Trimble, un-
constitutionally denied inheritance rights to illegitimate children with a dem-
onstrable relationship to the intestate—that is, those illegitimate children who
could convincingly evidence their paternity, despite their lack of a court order
of filiation. 71 He argued that New York need not exclude such illegitimate
children to accomplish its dual goal of ensuring the finality of probate pro-
ceedings and guarding against spurious claims."
Justice Powell, however, did not agree, and.found that the challenged
statute was a carefully considered balance between the achievement of the
state's interests and the uniform treatment of illegitimate and legitimate chil-
dren." Furthermore, Justice Powell found that section 4-1.2 was substan-
tially related to the purpose underlying the statute. First, he concluded that
the requirement. of a judicial record of filiation—and, hence, of an illegiti-
mate child's right. to notice of probate proceedings—greatly facilitated the
administration of an intestate's estate.' Second, by requiring that the ques-
tion of paternity he litigated during the father's lifetime, the statute ensured
the genuineness of claims against the father's estate." Thus, the plurality
found the New York statute, unlike the statute reviewed in Trimble, was con-
stitutionally sound.
justice Blackmun concurred with the Court's judgment and with most of
Justice Powell's opinion." He did not join in the plurality decision since he
believed the Court should have overruled, rather than distinguished, Trimble.
7' Id. at 269-71. In accepting this as § 4-I.2's purpose, Justice Powell relied
heavily on an opinion of a New York Surrogate who had participated in some of the
deliberations of the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and
Simplification of the Law of Estates which drafted and proposed enactment of § 4-1.2.
Id. See alto N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. Acr, § 1403 (McKinney 58A). But see text at notes
128-32 infra.
The New York legislature created this temporary commission in 1961 to study the
law and recommend needed changes. Commissions in New York function as messen-
gers to the legislature, presenting a complete and objective analysis of a problem and
explaining the pros and cons of the proposed changes. See, Fourth Report of the
Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of
the Law of Estates, Legis. Doc. 1965. No. 19 [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
See generally, Dana, Background Materials fio . Statutory Interpretation in New York, 14 REc:-
()RD or N.Y.C.11.A. 89 (1959); Macnoti;t1d, Forward; The New York State Law Revision
Commission —The Impact of Twenty Years, 40 CORN. L. Q. 641, 642-44 (1055).
7 ' 439 U.S. at 272.
72 Id. See Commission Report, supra note 70, at 266-67.
73
 439 U.S. at 274.
74 Id. at 271.
Id. at 271-72.
711 Id. at 276.
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He described the Trimble decision as a judicial reaction to a sad and appealing
fact situation. 77
 He also noted that there had been a strong dissent in Trim-
ble, with four Justices preferring to keep Labine as the controlling law for
intestacy law challenges by illegitimate children." The Trimble dissenters had
maintained that the Court's' prior justification for retaining the Labine analysis
when reviewing intestate succession statutes was still a valid expression of the
Court's proper role." The Labine analysis viewed regulation of the descent.
of property and the manner of creating estates as being entirely within the
state's control thereby leading the Court to afford broad scope to state discre-
tion in this particular area. 8" Furthermore, because justice Blackmun be-
lieved the effect of the Court's decision in Lalli would be a return to the
Labine-type of deference to state legislatures, he said that the principles of
La-bine should have been underscored and Trimble explicitly reversed.
Justice Stewart. responded to Justice Blackmun's stand that Trimble is now
"a derelict" in a brief concurring opinion." Fully accepting Justice Powell's
opinion, he reiterated that the Trimble and Lalli provisions were sufficiently
different to sustain opposite conclusions using the same method of inquiry.
Justice Stewart, disagreed with'thc proposition that the Lalli Court had failed
to give authoritative guidance to the lower courts and state legislatures." By
emphasizing that Justice Powell's opinion had followed Trimble, Justice Stewart
implied that the Labine standard had not been employed by the Court. 83
Referring the reader to his dissent in Trimble, Justice Rehnquist's con-
currence in Lalli consisted of a lengthy discourse on the Court's improper use
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution to invalidate legislation
based on classifications not considered suspect. 84 According to Justice
Rehnquist, if these classifications are not mindless or patently irrational the
Court exceeds its proper role when setting such classifications aside. 85 Justice
Rehnquist considered the New York statute to be rational, and he voted with
the plurality to affirm the statute's constitutionality.
The dissent in Lalli was more unified than the plurality, with four Jus-
tices joining in one opinion. These Justices were unable to agree with Justice
Powell that Trimble was distinguishable. Declaring section 4-1.2 to be inconsis-
tent with the standard established in Trimble, Justice Brennan wrote that the
77 Id.
78 Id. at 276-77.
7"
 430 U.S. at 776-77. justice Rehnquist, while agreeing that the challenged
statute was of the kind the Court should not overturn unless it was patently irrational,
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 777.
"" Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972). See also
In Re Estate of Karas, 61 111.2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1976).
"' 439 U.S. at 277.
82 Id. at 276.
s" Id.
84 Id. See 430 U.S. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Id. See also Matter of Estate of Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 71, 371 N.E.2d 481,
483, 484 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting) (section 4-1.2 is not mindless or totally irra-




state's interest could be adequately served by requiring paternity be proved by
a formal acknowledgement of paternity made by the father." Justice Bren-
nan sketched some examples of the injustice Lalli was likely to produce. For
instance, Justice Brennan noted, a voluntarily supported illegitimate child
rarely will inherit from the father since mothers and social welfare agents see
no need to bring paternity proceedings against supporting fathers.'" In ad-
dition, those who do think of instituting a paternity proceeding may prefer to
refrain, not wanting to disrupt the harmony of the filial relationship." Thus,
a number of acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children were
being excluded from inheritance rights by the statute."
Justice Brennan then reviewed the state's arguments accepted by Justice
Powell for upholding the validity of section 4-1.2. The state claimed that re-
liance on mere formal public acknowledgments would unduly hinder the
state's effort to minimize fraudulent claims of paternity. In response, Justice
Brennan suggested that New York might require illegitimates to comply with
a given standard of proof. 9° In addition, the dissent considered the state's
position that a judicial record is necessary for due process purposes to be a
weak claim. Justice Brennan thought that notice by publication would
adequately serve the state's interest in serving process on "unknown" illegiti-
mates who have valid claims to intestate succession from their natural
fathers. 9 ' Reiterating that the Trimble conclusion should have controlled in
the present case, since section 4-1.2 excluded forms of proof which do not
compromise the state's interests, the dissent would have invalidated the stat-
ute. 92
The disagreement between the plurality opinion and the dissent about
whether Lalli was distinguishable from Trimble is founded in their differing
interpretations of the Trimble decision. In Lalli, Justice Powell applied the
99
 439 U.S. at 278.
97 Id.
88 Id.
99 Id. In addition, the dissenting judge in the appellate court decision noted
that the failure to obtain a judicial determination of paternity may be due to careless-
ness or ignorance of the person instituting a support proceeding. Matter of Estate of
Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 371 N.E.2d 481, 484 (1977) (Cooke J., dissenting) rev'd sub nom.
Lalli v. LaIli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). For example, a court order of support, binding on
the father, need not make a judicial finding of paternity. After a support order is
obtained, would mothers or welfare agents realize they are acting•to the child's detri-
ment by failing to have a conclusive finding' of paternity? See N.Y. Esr., POWERS AND
TRUSTS LAW, § 4-1.2(3) (McKinney); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 425 (agreement to support),
§ 516 (agreement or compromise), § 517 (time for instituting proceedings), § 542 (or-
der of filiation) (McKinney 29A); Commission Report, supra note 67, at 267. But see In
Re Flemm, 85 Misc.2d 855, 863-64, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 578-79 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
"° 439 U.S. at 279. See In Re Estate of Burris, 361 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1978). Cf.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (U.L.A. § 2-109(2) (ii)) (requiring the illegitimate child to
show clear and convincing evidence of the filial relationship if the father has died
before a paternity determination is made).
"' 439 U.S. at 279. c f. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 318 (1950) (overruled constitutional objections to published notice on behalf
of beneficiaries whose interest or addresses are unknown to the trustee).
92
 439 U.S. at 279.
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Trimble standard in a less exacting manner than that which Justice Brennan
claimed was required. The resultant confusion will become apparent in sub-
sequent cases. Lalli does not clarify the appropriate standard of review to be
used—particularly because Justice Powell's interpretation of Trimble was
joined by only two other Justices. justices Blackmun and Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment based on the results of the traditional minimum standard of
review. The split in the Court's opinions invites litigation to determine the
direction in which the Court is moving and to test the strength of that direc-
tion.
III. ANALYSIS OF LAU/
In Lalli, Justice Powell couched his reasoning in terms of a comparison
with the Trimble decision. He claimed to use the standard of review enun-
ciated in Trimble, reaching a different conclusion by distinguishing Lalli on the
basis of both the character of the burden imposed by the statute and the state
interest the statute was designed to further." The following section will analyze
Justice Powell's opinion. The first part will examine how Justice Powell
employed the Trimble standard of review. It will he submitted that the stan-
dard employed was in fact a less stringent standard of review than that articu-
lated in Trimble, and as such obscures the proper standard to be used. The
second part of the analysis will examine whether Trimble was properly distin-
guished on the basis of the purposes the statutes were to further. This exami-
nation will demonstrate that the sole purpose the Court should have consid-
ered in examining the relationship of the statute's burden to its purpose is the
prevention of fraudulent claims by illegitimate children—the same purpose
the Court considered in Trimble. It will be submitted therefore that section
4-1.2 should have been judged, like the statute in Trimble, an unconstitution-
ally overbroad attempt by the state to deal with the problem of proving the
paternity of illegitimate children.
A. The Standard of Review EmploNed in Lalli
The principal difference between the standard of review employed in
Labine and that used in Trimble is the manner in which the means-ends test"
was applied. Functionally, Labine was an ends test: once the Court concluded
that the end sought by the state was within the sphere of legitimate state
interests, the constitutional inquiry was limited to a cursory examination of
the means employed to achieve that end. The Court required only the barest
relationship between the state's goal and the legislative classification in-
"3 430 U.S. at 776 n.17.
"4 This shorthand phrase describing the Court's mode of analysis as an in-
quiry into a "means-ends'' relationship was first articulated by Professor Gunther in his
1072 article. Gunther. supra note 12 at 20. See also Forum: Equal Protection and the
Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS Cox. 1,. Q. 645 (1075).
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volved. 95
 In cases decided after Labine, however, the Court reviewed provi-
sions discriminating against illegitimate children with a detailed examination
of both the ends and the means." This examination involves an assessment
of the precision with which the statute was drawn. The statute must reflect a
consideration that alternative solutions to the problem presented by fraudu-
lent claims of paternity which may be less restrictive upon illegitimate children
would hinder achievement of the state's goals. "7 This requirement makes the
substantial relationship scrutiny found in Trimble much stricter than the tradi-
tional equal protection scrutiny used in Labine.
The Lalli plurality retreated from fully employing the Trimble test. Al-
though Justice Powell purported to use the analysis the Court had employed
in Trimble, and used "substantial relationship" language, he did not in fact
apply the heightened standard of review mandated by Trimble. Instead, by
refusing to assess the precision with which section 4-1.2's classification was
drawn, he essentially reviewed the statute according to the more lenient tradi-
tional standard of review."
In Trimble, Justice Powell stated, the majority had reasoned that for the
state to assure accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of an intestate's
property, the danger of spurious claims might. justify statutory discrimination
against the illegitimate children of intestate men. The flaw in the Trimble pro-
vision, however, was that it totally excluded from inheritance illegitimate chil-
dren not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. That provi-
sion, Justice Powell explained, served to disqualify an unnecessarily large
number of illegitimate children. Justice Powell perfunctorily concluded that.
section 4-1.2 did not. share such a defect."
To reach his conclusion that the New York statute was not constitution-
ally infirm, justice Powell effectively ignored the question the Trimble Court
would have framed. Had he incorporated the substantial relationship test with
its requirement of careful tailoring into his analysis of Lalli, the question that
he should have posed would have been: although section 4-1.2 rationally
furthers the state's broad aim of a just and orderly disposition of an estate,'"
"5 Such a standard of review in the equal protection area almost always sig-
nifies that the statute will be upheld. See note 12 supra.
1 ' See text at notes 29-48 supra.
17 See note 55 supra.
"' See note 12 supra.
"" 439 U.S. at 273. justice Powell explained that
[i]nheritance is barred only where there has been a failure to secure evi-
dence of paternity during the father's lifetime in the manner prescribed by
the State. This is not a requirement that inevitably disqualifies an unneces-
sarily large number of children born out of wedlock.
M. Then, in response to the dissent's comment that this requirement rarely will be
satisfied if the father had willingly recognized and supported the illegitimate child, id.
at 278, justice Powell explained that a father, willing to acknowledge paternity, can
waive his defenses in a paternity proceeding, can institute such a proceeding himself
or can totally avoid this entire problem by providing for his illegitimate child by will.
Id. at 273, 273 n.10. For an explanation of the inadequacy of Justice Powell's remarks
see text at notes t04-13 infra. Sec also note 46 supra.
1 " The provision furthers this goal by eliminating the need to determine
paternity after an alleged father has died intestate. Avoiding post-death litigation on
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does the fact that discrimination results from the use of a single and abscilute
criterion of paternity'" infringe on the rights of illegitimate children more
than is necessary to further the aim of the state? It was, in fact, the dissenters
who responded to the Trimble question, taking the position that the New York
provision could have been written more equitably without compromising the
state's interest.'" This conclusion, the dissent noted, required reversal of the
lower court's decision and invalidation of the statute.'"
Although he originally articulated that the correct level of scrutiny for
Lalli was that level used in Trimble, Justice Powell expressly rejected the dis-
senters' position, noting that the precision of a statute is not a matter of
specialized judicial competence. 104 justice Powell's reluctance to examine the
statute in such a manner, however, is contrary to common judicial practice.
There are times when the Court does examine a statute's precision; this is an
important element in cases concerning suspect classifications, calling for strict
scrutiny of a statute."' In addition, although illegitimacy has never been
declared suspect, the Court does have a basis in Trimble for questioning
whether a classification is being grossly over or underinclusive in accomplish-
ing a valid state goal. In both Trimble and in Lalli, Justice Powell agreed that
the relationship must be substantial and finely tuned—not merely ra-
tional."' Such a test permits the Court to make a value judgment as to the
precision with which a classification based on illegitimacy will further the as-
serted statutory purpose. Nonetheless, Justice Powell did not scrutinize the
New York provision in the manner which Trimble mandated, failing to con-
sider fully the requirement of careful tailoring. Such scrutiny should have
exposed the statute's overbreadth in accomplishing the state's goal.
this issue protects "innocent adults and those rightfully interested in their estates from
fraudulent claims of heirship and harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to
establish themselves as illegitimate heirs." Commission Report, supra note 67, at 265.
101
 The criterion is absolute only when the parents have not married sub-
sequent to the illegitimate child's birth. However, as Trimble expressly denies the state
the opportunity to precondition an illegitimate child's inheritance rights on his parent's
marital status, it is the burden that the state imposes in those cases where the parents
have not married each other subsequent to the child's birth with which we are solely
concerned.
112
 439 U.S. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan asserted,
But even if my confidence in the accuracy of formal public acknowl-
edgments of paternity were unfounded, New York has available less drastic
means of screening out fraudulent claims of paternity. in addition to re-
quiring formal acknowledgments of paternity, New York might require il-
legitimates to prove paternity by an elevated standard of proof, e.g., clear
and convincing evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. In addition, Justice Brennan stated, "Publication notice and a short limitations
period in which claims against the estate could be filed could serve [the state purpose
of protecting estates from belated claims by unknown illegitimatesi as well as, if not
better than, the present scheme." Id. at 279.
I Hs
 Id. at 279.
1 " Id. at 274. See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976).
" 5 Sec note 12 supra.
"" Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772; Lalli , 439 U.S. at 268. See also note 12 supra.
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The statute's deficiency becomes evident upon a consideration of two
realities for an illegitimate child whose father lives in New York. First, the
illegitimate child rarely will inherit under the provision if his father has will-
ingly supported him, whereas he would more likely inherit if his father did
not want to support. him. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, those
fathers who have recognized and are willing to support their illegitimate chil-
dren are not brought to court by either mothers or welfare agents.'" Al-
though Justice Powell remarked that a willing father always can institute a
paternity proceding himself, 108 it is unlikely that many fathers are aware their
failure to do so will have such a detrimental effect on the illegitimate child's
rights should the father die intestate.'"
The second practical difficulty with the tailoring of the statute concerns
the existence of another statute in New York that encourages putative fathers
to settle paternity claims without resorting to the intricacies of an adjudicatory
process."° The putative father can enter into a binding agreement with the
mother for the support of the illegitimate child which bars all other remedies
the mother arid child might have had. Such an agreement does not include a
court order of filiation. Section 4-1.2 specifically states that "the existence of
an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not
qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the absence of an
order of filiation."'" The New York legislature's intention to use this bind-
ing agreement as an incentive for the parents to avoid onerous paternity pro-
ceedings "2
 conflicts with its requirement of a court order of filiation as a
precondition to inheritance from an intestate father by an illegitimate
child."'
In sum, although Justice Powell stated that he was using the Trimble prin-
ciples,'" he failed to comply with Trimble's heightened standard of review. In
light of his recognition of the willing-unwilling father problem inherent in the
New York statute, his opinion never adequately explained why the statute did
not disqualify an unnecessarily large number of illegitimate children from
paternal intestate succession. Nor did Justice Powell ever respond to the dis-
sent's comment that publication notice would be less restrictive upon illegiti-
mate children without hindering the state's aim. His plurality opinion did not
explore the relationship of the statute's burden to its purpose to the same
107
 439 U.S. at 278. See In Re Flemm, 85 Misc,2d 855, 864, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573,
578 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
1 " Id. at 273.
1 " justice Powell also noted that "a father is always free to provide for his
illegitimate child by will." Id. at 273 n.10. Such an observation, however, should be of
no significance within the context of the appropriate equal protection analysis. See
note 46, supra.
N.Y . FAN. CT. ACT § 516 (McKinney).
'" N.Y. EsT., PovvERs and TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a) (3) (McKinney). See Commis-
sion Report, supra note 67 at 267.
12 Bacon v. Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d 477, 480, 386 N.E.2d 1327, 1328 (1979).
1t3 For a comparison of § 4-1.2 and other New York statutes with proof of
paternity requirements, see 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 709-12 (1977).
" 4 439 U.S. at 268.
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extent as in Trimble, nor did he require a demonstration of the feasibility of
less restrictive means of accomplishing the stated aim. Thus, because a re-
duced level of inquiry was employed by the plurality—although articulated as
being the same as that used in Trimble —Lalli obscures the extent of the
proper examination due challenges brought by illegitimate children to intes-
tacy laws.
B. The Improper Determination of Section 4 - I .2's Purpose
Justice Powell's failure to apply the proper standard of review is not the
only flaw in the Lalli opinion. The failure to rely on the correct sources to
determine the purpose of the New York statute—and thus the failure to
examine the statute's burden in light of its actual purpose—marks the second
flaw of Lalli. Had the correct method been followed, it is doubtful Justice
Powell would have declared that a substantial relationship existed between the
burden imposed by section 4-1.2 and the purpose it was designed to further.
Initially it must be stated that the Court requires a statute challenged on equal
protection grounds to be scrutinized for its relationship to the actual purpose
the legislature designed it to further.'" In Trimble, it was noted that particu-
larly with classifications for which the Court will not automatically defer to the
legislature, more than mere incantation of a proper state purpose is required
to justify an otherwise invidious classification.'" By requiring that the actual
purpose be considered in its analysis, the Court. rejected the traditional ap-
proach of accepting as the legislative purpose any conceivable state of facts,
proffered by the state or by the members of the Court itself, which can justify
challenged statutory discrimination."'
'" Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975), (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The reason statutory purpose is sought in equal protection cases is different than in
any other statutory interpretation context. The challenging party does not say, as is the
common starting point for many inquiries into statutory purpose, "1T]he statute
should not be read to include me in a particular class." Rather the party argues,
"[P]lacing me in the .class affected/unaffected by the statute is unconstitutional." See
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. I 065, 1(177-78 (1969).
115
 430 U.S. at 769.
117 The traditional approach was that used in 11.•cGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961). There the Court said:
Although no precise formula has developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only it' the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.
Id. See, e.g., Kola v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners. 330 U.S. 552, 563
(1947) (reaching its conclusion that a challenged Louisiana pilotage law did not deny
equal protection, the Court, rather than looking to the actual purpose behind the law,
conjured up possible purposes of the Louisiana legislature); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948) (possible purposes for restricting female employment as a bartender to
January 1980]	 CASENOTES	 497
When, as is true of section 4-1.2, the statute's language does not reveal its
purpose, the Court must look to extrinsic aids to ascertain the statute's actual
purpose.'" The most important extrinsic aid to the Court is the legislative
history of the statute." 9 Various materials make up legislative history, ' 2 °
with no single material considered by the Court to be the definitive statement
of the statute's purpose. 12 ' The legislative history of section 4-1.2 reveals
wives and daughters of bar owners); Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1077-1080 (1969).
This traditional approach has been rejected by the Court. As Justice Brennan
stated in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
"while we have in the past exercised our imaginations to conceive of possible rational
justifications for statutory classifications ... we have recently declined to manufacture
justifications in order to save an apparently invalid statutory classification." Id. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), where the Court looked at the classification
to see its relation to "at least one of the stated purposes justifying the different treat-
ment ... Id. at 376 (emphasis added). The Johnson Court found error in the district
court's excessively broad statement of the congressional objective and narrowed its
focus to the specific purpose the statute, when read in conjunction with its legislative
history, was to further. Id. at 377.
"B Extrinsic aids are information pertaining to a statute but not included in
the statute's text. These extrinsic aids generally are comprised of the statute's legisla-
tive history and historical context. By comparison, intrinsic aids relate solely to the text
itself and include items such as the definitions and popular usages of the textual lan-
guage. See generally HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1201, 1243-64, 1266-69 (tentative ed. 1958) [here-
inafter cited as HART AND SACKS].
"" Cf. Note, A Decade of Legislative History in the Supreme Court: 1950-1959, 46
VA. L. REv. 1408 (1960) (although reliance on legislative history to interpret a statute
has been criticized in the past, the Court seems quite willing to refer to legislative
history when a question of meaning or statutory purpose arises).
120 Employing legislative history as an aid in statutory construction is more dif-
ficult with state legislation than with federal legislation. State legislatures do not pub-
lish the amount of material Congress does. Committee reports usually are available,
but transcripts of state legislative hearings and debates rarely are published. Legislative
journals, skeletal records of the statutory history, are maintained but have little sub-
stantive value regarding the . comments of the legislators. As to the viability of using
legislative history when construing state statutes, although some states have expressly
provided by statute that legislative history may be fully considered, see, e.g., 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (c) (Purdon), the state courts have generally evolved their
own rules of reliability. See (generally) FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1972); Cashman,
Availability of Records of Legislative Debates, 24 RECORD of N.Y.C.B.A. 153 (1969); Dana,
Background Materials for Statutory Interpretation in New York, 14 RECORD of N.Y.C.B.A. 80
(1959) (hereinafter cited as Dana).
121 Even so, these materials are given different weight depending on their
purpose within the legislative process. While committee reports are considered very
good indicia of the purpose of statutes, less formal material—such as floor debates,
hearings and statements by sponsors of hills—are also admissible for determining
statutory purpose, although they are generally afforded less weight. The less formal
the material is, the less appropriate it is for judicial consideration. There must he some
showing that the legislature considered the material in its decision-making process. In
this light, isolated statements by individual legislators, not primarily responsible for a
hill's enactment, have very little persuasive value for use in ascertaining the purpose a
statute is designed to further. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 209 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (testimony or statements made by legislators
998	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 IVO. 21:978
that the statute was a product of a special Commission, created by the New
York legislature to make a comprehensive study of New York's law of estates
and to prepare statutory revisions where necessary. 122 The Commission is-,
sued a formal report to the legislature, as an appendix to its proposed bill,
explaining the defects of the then present law by which illegitimate children
inherited from their intestate parents.'" The report also explained the pur-
pose of the recommended revisions. 124 The New York legislature enacted
the bill, as section 4-1.2, exactly as proposed by the Commission. 125
The Commission Report broadly explained the purpose of section 4-1.2:
"to alleviate the plight of the illegitimate child."'" Section 4-1.2(a)(2), how-
ever, was explained more specifically. That subsection was designed explicitly
to prevent fraudulent claims of paternity and to mitigate the difficulties in the
administration of estates presented by "harassing litigation instituted by those
seeking to establish themselves as illegitimate heirs."'"
after a statute has been enacted have no probative value and considered inadmissible
to show statutory purpose); Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548, 563-65 (1976) (sponsors' statements are an important part of legislative
history to he used in statutory construction); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 132 (1975) ("post passage remarks, however explicit, cannot serve to
change the legislative intent of Congress before the Act's passage"); Portland Cement
Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381-82 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (statements by legis-
lators who were among the most active in securing passage of statute entitled to some
weight); International T. & T. Corp. v. General T. & E. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 921 (9th
Cir. 1975) (committee reports made after a careful study of a problem entitled to
greater weight than are floor debates and hearings); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
383 F.2d 166, 175 (2nd Cir. 1967) (individual and 'isolated statements during floor
debates not entitled to same respect as carefully prepared committee reports, while
statements of sponsors who are the most active legislators in getting a bill enacted of
some significance), American Airlines v. C.A.B., 365 F.2d 939, 949 D.C. Cir. 1966)
(generally accepted maxim of statutory construction that the report of the committee
.formulating the proposed statute for legislative approval take precedence over state-
ments made in legislative debates); Friedman v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 484, 488
(S.D. Ga. 1973) (affidavits of legislators who drafted the statute inadmissible aid to
statutory construction); Southern Railway Company v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 134 Ga.
App. 219, 221, 213 S.E.2d 903, 906 (1975) (even if draftsman of statute had been a
legislator rather than a lawyer, his affidavit as to how the statute was intended to be
applied as an expression of the general legislative intention would be inadmissible). See
generally HART AND SACKS supra note 118, at 1283-86. Cf. In re John Children, 61 Misc.
2d 347, 358-61, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 809-11 (1969), where in light of the fact that no other
formal legislative materials were available, the court relied on the contents of an assem-
blyman's letter on the basis of unequivocal assurance that although the letter, which
concerned statutory intention, was not physically a part of the legislators' consideration
before voting on the statute, the contents of the letter were before the legislature in
verbal form,
122 See note 70 ,supra.
123 Commission Report, supra note 70 at 235.
121 Id. at 265-68. See also id. at 234.
' 25 See id. at 233. See also note '3 supra.
12" Commission Report, supra note 70 at 37. See also 439 U.S. at 269.
127 Commission Report, supra note 70 at 265. The Report added,
The utmost caution should be exercised to protect innocent men from un-
just accusations in paternity claims. To avoid this hazard, no informal
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After recognizing the Commission's Report as explaining section 4-I.2's
purpose, Justice Powell turned to a statement made by a New York Surrogate
which purported to explain the Report's explanation. ' 28 Justice Powell
quoted the Surrogate at length, although he was well aware that the Surrogate
had been only a participant in some of' the Commission's deliberations and
was not a Commission member. 12" According to the Surrogate, the "real
concern to the experienced members of the commission""" involved the pro-
cedural problem of being unable to serve process on the illegitimate child, if
he were made an unconditional distributee in intestacy."' Justice Powell
seized upon this explanation as indicating the true purpose for which the New
York legislature enacted section 4-1.2.' 32
The impact of Justice Powell's reliance on this post-enactment statement
is demonstrated by a comparison of the way the two purposes affect the out-
come of the appropriate judical scrutiny. Applying the minimum rationality test
to the classification created by section 4-1.2, the statute would be found con-
stitutional if the purpose of the statute were, as the Commission stated, to
prevent fraudulent claims. 133 Similarly, the statute would be found constitu-
tional if the purpose were that presented by the Surrogate—to enable process
to be served on the illegitimate children of a decedent.'"
When a more stringent test is employed, however, as Justice Powell used
in Trimble and professed to use in Lalli, the result depends on the purpose
discerned. To reiterate a point made earlier, 135 in looking for a substantial
relationship between the goal of preventing fraudulent claims of paternity
method of acknowledgment has been provided for in the recommenda-
tions. While a formal acknowledgment alone would be a considerable ad-
vance over the statutes of most states allowing inheritance from an
acknowledging father, it is felt that the recommendation here made gives
even more protection against. such hazard. The procedure in other states
provides merely that any informal witnessed writing establishing the rela-
tionship of father and child between the deceased and the claimant is suffi-
cient to establish paternity, allows paternity to be established after the
death of the father, thus affording considerable opportunity for falsifica-
tion of' evidence and inviting harassing litigation. These problems are
eliminated by requiring a court order establishing paternity during the
lifetime of the father."
Id. at 266-67.
Although neither the New York legislature nor the New York state courts have
specifically enunciated principles for using the available legislative history for statutory
construction, see note 120, supra, the stale courts tend to consider committee reports a
highly persuasive background source for statutory purpose. See Dana, supra note 120.
A committee report logically should be given, additional persuasive value if, as oc-
curred with section 4-1.2, the legislature enacts a proposed bill without any changes.
See text and note at note 125 supra.
128 439 U.S. at 270.
129 Id .
' 3° In Re Flemm, 85 Misc.2d 855, 859, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (Sur. Ct., 1975).
131 Id.
132 439 U.S. at 271.
133 Matter of Estate of Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 70-71, 371 N.E.2d 481, 483-84
(1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
134 439 U.S. at 276 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135 See text at notes 53-54 supra.
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and the classifications designed to further this goal, the Court has required
that a legislature carefully tailor these classifications to reflect less restrictive
alternatives. Excluding illegitimate children who do not have a court order of
filiation from intestate inheritance is not substantially related to the prevention
of fraudulent claims, when a significant number of these children have other
competent evidence of the paternal relation. This would follow from the
Trimble decision, where the statute's purpose had been the prevention of
fraudulent claims but the statute was infirm because it was unnecessarily
overbroad in its ,exclusion of illegitimate children from inheritance rights.
Thus, if Justice Powell had relied on the purpose presented by the Commis-
sion Report, section 4-1.2 would have been invalidated as unconstitutional.
It is easier to reach the conclusion justice Powell reached in his opinion
when section 4-1.2's burden is reviewed with the purpose presented by the
Surrogate. Conditioning an illegitimate child's inheritance from his intestate
father on a court order of filiation is substantially related to the goal of mak-
ing the existence of the illegitimate child known to an administrator. Knowing
that the illegitimate child has a rightful interest in the estate, the adminis-
trator can serve him with process and give him an opportunity to be heard. If
reliance on this purpose, as presented by the Surrogate, were proper, justice
Powell's finding would be defensible.
Such reliance was improper, though, given the appropriate hierarchy of
usable legislative material to discern statutory purpose. In this light, Justice
Powell's opinion was flawed by his failure to examine the New York statute
against the same purpose (he statute in Trimble had been designed to further.
Justice Powell did recognize, at least initially, that the New York statute was
designed to eliminate unfounded claims of heirship. Yet his examination into
the relationship between the character of the statute's burden—being the ex-
clusive means of proving the paternal relationship—and the purpose of the
burden emphasized that purpose to be the need for a judicial record of an
illegitimate child's existence, a purpose distinctly different from the statutory
purpose discussed in the Trimble decision. Thus, Justice Powell avoided having
to square his examination with statements made by the Court in earlier cases
to the effect that a state cannot presumptively exclude illegitimate children
from rights granted legitimate children solely to avert fraudulent claims.'" If
he had examined New York's manner of resolving this problem of fraudulent
claims, the Trimble decision would have required him to strike down the stat-
ute as unconstitutional because of its unnecessary exclusivity in acceptable
proof of paternity. Instead, Justice Powell incorrectly placed greater emphasis
on a post-enactment statement of someone who played only a minor role in
the statute's enactment than on the text of the Commission's Report, and thus
was able to affirm the constitutionality of the New York statute.
In sum, an analysis of Lail reveals that although the Court was given an
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard of review for intestacy law
challenges by illegitimate children, the Court. failed to do so. While the Court
articulated the standard it. employed in Lath as heightened scrutiny of the
relationship between section 4-1.2's burden and purpose, reiterating the lan-
guage employed in Trimble, the actual scrutiny of the relationship effectively
retreated from the "middle-tier" level of review. The most crucial element of




the review in Trimble—questioning the precision with which a burden is
,drawn—was expressly omitted from the review in Lalli. Nonetheless, the de-
sired impact of this retreat was not made clear. The Court chose not to over-
rule Trimble, claiming instead that it was distinguishable. Distinguishing Trim-
ble on the basis of statutory purpose, however, was erroneous. Had the
Court's reasoning not been flawed on this point, a review of the New York
statute for its relationship to the same purpose found furthered by the statute
in Trimble would have enabled the Court to invalidate the statute and thereby
illustrate more clearly the appropriate scrutiny of intestate succession schemes
challenged by illegitimate children.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A TRIMBLE-LALLI
RECONCILIATION FOR STATES HAVING INTESTATE SUCCESSION
PROVISIONS SIMILAR TO THE NEW YORK ESTATES,
POWERS AND TRUST LAW SECTION 4-1.2
To ascertain the significance of distinguishing Trimble in the Lalli deci-
sion, an examination of the various types of statutes providing for paternal
intestate succession of illegitimate children is helpful. In broad terms, they can
be categorized according to three main types of requirements. One is the re-
quirement considered in Trimble: an illegitimate child inherits from his intes-
tate father only after he haS been legitimated by the subsequent intermarriage
of his parents combined with his father's acknowledgment of paternity."'
The Court in Trimble held this requirement to be unconstitutional. A second
type of requirement is that which was challenged in Lalli: an illegitimate child
not legitimated by the subsequent intermarriage of his parents, inherits from
his intestate father only when a "specific method" of proof has been satis-
fied.'" The Lalli Court established that this type of requirement is constitu-
tionally permissible. The third type of requirement is modeled after section
2-109 of the Uniform Probate Code: unless an illegitimate child has been
legitimated or paternity has been judicially established prior to the father's
death, an illegitimate child inherits intestate from his father only when he
satisfies a given "standard" of proof of the paternal relationship.'" The con-
stitutionality of this requirement has never been decided by the Court.' 4 "
I:" Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.090; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West)
(struck down in Lowell v. Kowalski, 198(1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1243, 405 N.E.2d 135 pur-
suant to the Equal Rights Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution); Miss. Cour
ANN. § 91-1-15; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474,070 (Vernon); N. Fl. REv, STAT. ANN. § 457.42;
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1-8; S.C., CODE § 20-1-60; W. VA. Com § 42-1-6; Wyo. STAT.
§ 2-3-109.
"" See notes 143 and 144
39 ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045; Amt.. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109; Cow. REv.
STAT. § 15-11-109; DEL. CODE ANN tit. 12, § 508; IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch . 110 1/2, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd); IowA CODE ANN. § 633.222 (West); Mo. Esr.
TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-208; Micit. STAT. ANN. § 27.5111 (no standard of proof
specified); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 9IA-2-109; NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309; NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-41 (West); N.11. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2107 (NI rdon); S.D. PROBATE CODE § 2-100; TENN. CODE ANN § 31-206; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-100; VT. STAT. ANN. DI. 14, § 553; VA. Com; § 64.1-5.1. See also WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 11.04.081 (same).
"" At least four justices, however, believe that a statute requiring an illegiti-
mate child to satisfy a particular standard of proof recognizes the possibility of the
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The statutes within these three categories all separate illegitimate from
legitimate children for purposes of granting paternal inheritance rights—but
by different mechanisms. The Trimble judgment held that one type of classifi-
cation was not constitutionally permissible while the Lath judgment held that a
different type was. According to Justice Powell's opinion in Lath, however, the
Trimble and Lalli judgments differed not only because the burdens imposed by
the two classifications differed, but also because the statutory purposes with
which the classifications were reviewed by the Court also differed. In Trimble,
the statutory purpose was the prevention of fraudulent. claims of paternity. In
Lath, while this was a secondary purpose of section 4-1.2, the primary purpose
emphasized by the plurality was the need for a judicial record of a father's
relation to his illegitmate child. Regardless of the validity of this emphasis,'"
Justice Powell's Lalli reasoning rests on the difference in statutory purpose
between the two statutes.
Although Justice Powell stated that the judgment in Lath controlled all
challenges to statutes requiring an illegitimate child to satisfy a "specific
method - of proof of paternity to be eligible to inherit intestate from his
father,' 42
 a necessary reconciliation between the Trimble and Lalli decisions
may mean that Lalli's precedential strength will be limited to only those stat-
utes requiring a method of proof that becomes part. of a judicial record. A
closer look at the statutes requiring a "specific method" of proof reveals that.
the methods required vary among the states. Some states require a judicial
record of paternity be created. 143 Some, though, simply require a formal, wit-
nessed documentation of the paternal relatiopship. 144 While Justice Powell
noted that the Lath decision applies to all such statutes, regardless of the
method of proof required, this may not be true. Equal protection challenges
to those statutes which can be justified by a statutory purpose identical to the
variety of forms of evidence which an illegitimate child may possess while still achiev-
ing the state's goal of preventing fraudulent claims. 439 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
141 See text at notes 115-36 supra.
' 42
 439 U.S. at 272 n.8.
1 " ALA. CODE § 26-11-2; D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 19-316 (West); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-103; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 560:2-109; IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Burns); N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10; N.D. CENT.
Copt: § 14-17-04, 05; OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2105.18 (Baldwin); TEX. PROB. CODE.
ANN. tit. 17A, § 42.
'44
	 STAT. ANN. § 61-141;. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-274 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732108 (West); KANSAS STAT. ANN.
§ 59-501; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1003; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (West);
Nev. REV. STAT. § 134.170; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215; OR. REV. STAT. § 112.105;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West).
The methods required in these statutes are exclusive. If the particular documen-
tation or a statutorily permitted alternative cannot be produced, no other evidence will
suffice. See In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970), dis-
missed 402 U.S. 903 (1971). In this case, an adjudication of paternity was held not to
confer any right of inheritance since it was not the equivalent of the required statutory
proof. Although an appeal of the case was dismissed by the Supreme Court, without




purpose with which section 4-1.2 was reviewed clearly will be controlled by
Lalli. Lalli's judgment, however, cannot automatically affirm the constitutional-
ity of statutes requiring a specific method of proof that does not become part
of a judicial record when it is highly unlikely these statutes further any pur-
pose other than the facilitation of problems of proof so as to create a just and
orderly disposition of an intestate's property. This is especially true given the
Court's position that the state cannot conclusively and presumptively exclude
illegitimate children from inheriting intestate as a way of facilitating poten-
tially difficult problems of proof of paternity. 145 Rather, the constitutionality
of these statutes will have to be examined by the Court in a subsequent case.
If the Trimble decision is to remain good law, in this re-examination of the
constitutional issue, a showing that. the statute excludes alternative methods of
proof that may be less restrictive upon a significant number of illegitimate
children without compromising the statutory purpose of preventing fraudu-
lent claims should compel a finding that these statutes are unconstitutional.
Therefore, to continue to uphold Trimble, the effect of Lalli will be limited
only to statutes requiring a specific method of proof which furthers the due
process rights of illegitimate children with valid claims of heirship to notice
and an opportunity to be heard.
CONCLUSION
In Trimble v. Gordon the Court directed lower courts to use heightened
equal protection scrutiny when reviewing challenges by illegitimate children to
state intestate succession laws. Trimble, however, controlled only those intestate
succession statutes which conditioned inheritance by illegitimate children from
their fathers on the marital status of the natural parents. In Lalli v. Lalli the
Court had the opportunity to clarify the desired effect of its Trimble decision.
Despite this opportunity, Lalli only obscured the appropriate standard of re-
view for lower courts to use. Regardless of the plurality opinion's use of ."sub-
stantial relationship" language, the plurality did not fully apply Trimble's
heightened scrutiny in analyzing the constitutionality of the statute. Instead,
"5 See note 53 supra. But see Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762
(1979) which considered the constitutionality of a statute that gives an illegitimate child
intestate succession rights from and through his father, provided that the child's par-
ents had intermarried after his birth, or a judicial decree of paternity was entered
during the father's lifetime, or the father's written admission of paternity was recorded
with the court during the father's lifetime. The statute was sustained upon the author-
ity of Lalli. The court did not, however, rely on the purpose asserted in Lalli, although
both specific methods of proof provided for by the challenged statute require a judi-
cial record of paternity be created. Rather, the court summarized Justice Powell's opin-
ion as describing the New York statute's purpose to be the alleviation of the peculiar
problems of proof presented by illegitimate children in order to obtain just and or-
derly dispositions of property at death. Id. at 767. The court noted the statutory pur-
pose of the challenged statute to be this very purpose and concluded that, in accord-
ance with Justice Powell's decision in Lalli, the challenged statute is substantially related
to the lawful interest it is intended to promote. Id. at 768. Cf. Everage v. Gibson, 372
So.2d 829 (Ala. 1979) (statutory purpose expressed in Lath used to distinguish Trimble
from Lalli and sustain intestacy statute requiring a judicial record be established).
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the Court's decision in Lalli increased the acceptable level of tolerance for
classifications in intestate succession schemes based on the legitimacy of a
child's birth. Thus, Lalli represents a retreat from the course plotted by Trim-
ble.
This retreat, however, may be of limited significance. Because the Lalli
Court expressly chose not to overrule Trimble, the two decisions must be rec-
onciled. Lalli does state that it will control all challenges to laws providing that
intestate succession from the father by an illegitimate child depends on the
satisfaction of a particular method of proof of paternity. A Trimble
-Lalli rec-
onciliation, however, may require that Lalli control those statutes justified by
the need to have the father's relation to his illegitimate child on judicial rec-
ord, while Trimble controls those statutes justified by the need to prevent
fraudulent claims of paternity. Indeed, although Justice Powell noted the con-
trary in Lalli, Trimble may well control the constitutionality of statutes requir-
ing specific methods of proof that do not create a judicial record or in any
other way serve the due process interests of illegitimate children.
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